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PRIVATE LITIGATION TO ENFORCE 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN MUTUAL FUNDS: 
DERIVATIVE SUITS, DISINTERESTED 
DIRECTORS AND THE IDEOLOGY OF  
INVESTOR SOVEREIGNTY 
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT* 
The scandals of 2003 involving late trading, market timing, and the 
selective disclosure of portfolio information have brought renewed 
attention to the long-recognized problems of enforcing fiduciary 
obligations in mutual funds.1 Intense regulatory and judicial attention in 
the late 1960s and 70s focused on the disappointing behavior of fund 
fiduciaries with respect to either the payment of or failure to recapture 
larger than necessary brokerage commissions and other kinds of diversions 
that enriched fund sponsors. Private litigation took the lead in seeking 
remediation, and the famous cases which resulted—Moses v. Burgin,2 
Rosenfeld v. Black,3 and Fogel v. Chestnutt,4 among others—set a tone of 
high investor expectations of care and loyalty. 
Gradually, however, the judicial stance softened, with the Supreme 
Court’s 1979 decision in Burks v. Lasker5 being pivotal. Courts 
increasingly seized on the presence of “disinterested” directors on mutual 
fund boards—something effectively mandated by rules under the 
Investment Company Act of 19406 (the “’40 Act”)—as reason to reduce 
 * Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Special 
thanks to Tamar Frankel, Mercer Bullard, commentators and participants at the ILEP conference, and 
workshop participants at the University of Cincinnati College of Law for comments on an earlier draft, 
and to Alan Audi for excellent research assistance. 
 1. For a good overview of the law and economics associated with these events, see Paul G. 
Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161 (2004). On the 
underlying market timing issue, decided well before the scandals broke, see Windsor Sec., Inc. v. 
Hartford Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1993); First Lincoln Holdings, Inc. v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc’y, 164 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also Conrad S. Ciccotello et al., Trading 
at Stale Prices with Modern Technology: Policy Options for Mutual Funds in the Internet Age, 7 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 6 (2002). 
 2. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971). 
 3. Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971) (sale of advisory contract). 
 4. Fogel v. Chestnut, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 5. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
 6. The Act requires that at least forty percent of the fund’s board be disinterested, except in very 
unusual circumstances (section 10(a)), and effectively requires a majority of disinterested directors if 
the fund’s principal underwriter is an affiliate of the adviser. The SEC in turn has made crucial 
regulatory privileges turn on whether the board has a majority of disinterested directors for all funds. 
See Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7932, 
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the level of judicial scrutiny to allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, 
even under statutory provisions that indicate a special federal sensitivity to 
such breaches.7 Not coincidentally, cases became harder for plaintiffs to 
win. 
None of this should come as a surprise to those familiar with the 
parallel legal history of private securities litigation generally. After a 
period in which investor rights flourished, the mid-1970s brought a sudden 
wave of judicial skepticism—fear of strike suits became reason enough to 
cabin otherwise investor-friendly doctrines.8 Regulatory competition at the 
state level of law-making became a virtue,9 not the cause for fear of a race 
to the bottom (and hence the appeal to a large-scale federalization of 
corporate law) that it had been to the generation before. State law was 
promoting the role of independent directors and the “cleansing” processes 
of corporate governance as a substitute for judicial intervention.10 There is 
no doubt that these trends were influential in the mutual fund area,11 
explaining much about the diminishing demands of the case law.  
The aim of this paper is to critique some of the key judicial steps, with 
particular attention to private securities litigation that takes the form of a 
derivative action on behalf of a particular fund. My critique will not dwell 
on the pending cases directed against the late trading and market timing 
abuses in any great detail, although these surely are important.12 As New 
York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer emphasized in his remarks and 
enforcement philosophy after exposing the misbehavior, these issues—
though involving many hundreds of millions of dollars in the aggregate—
were relatively small compared to other matters of concern in an $8 trillion 
Exchange Act Release No. 43,786, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 
(Jan. 16, 2001). In response to the scandals, the standard for gaining those privileges was extended to a 
requirement of seventy-five percent disinterested directors and an independent board chairman, among 
other governance reforms. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004). This rulemaking was struck down on procedural grounds 
in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 7. See infra notes 59–85 and accompanying text. 
 8. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
 9. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 10. E.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW ch. 5 (1985). For a classic critique, with 
substantial attention to mutual fund directors, see Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—
Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 618–19 (1982). 
 11. For a contemporaneous call for an increased role for disinterested directors on conflict 
transactions, see Alan Rosenblat & Martin E. Lybecker, Some Thoughts on the Federal Securities 
Laws Regulating External Investment Management Arrangements and the ALI Federal Securities 
Code Project, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 587 (1976). 
 12. On the applicability of section 36(a) to late trading and market timing, see SEC v. PIMCO 
Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/4
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industry.13 The broader issues involve fiduciary responsibility across a 
wide range of matters including management fees, distribution expenses, 
brokerage commissions, and the like.  
This article focuses on independent directors and the processes of 
mutual fund corporate governance. To be clear, I believe (and research 
shows) that disinterested directors do add value as a form of shareholder 
protection, and this fact justifies the SEC’s efforts to strengthen their role. 
But they are far from a panacea. While that point alone is almost trite, 
exploring some of the unique features of mutual fund governance shows 
why judges and policymakers should not even try to reason by analogy to 
governance in other kinds of corporations. Yet that is exactly what Burks14 
and its progeny have done. Even more interesting is considering the 
governance consequences of the primary distinction between mutual funds 
and business corporations: the convergence of the capital and product 
markets that occurs when the products being sold by the mutual fund are 
its own securities. Here, the ideology of consumer sovereignty easily 
crowds out a strong norm of fiduciary responsibility. “Disinterested” 
directors see little need to measure the behavior of the fund’s advisor by 
reference to anything other than marketplace success—and indeed can be 
chosen precisely because they embrace the ideology of the markets and 
see the law’s assignment to them of strong fiduciary responsibilities as 
something of an exercise in formalism. If this happens, as I suspect is 
commonplace, then their checking power will be moderate at best, and the 
case law’s assumption of more, the basis for the decreasing judicial 
oversight we have seen over the last twenty-five years, misplaced. 
I. MUTUAL FUND LITIGATION TO REMEDY FIDUCIARY BREACHES 
The typical mutual fund is organized by a sponsor who expects to 
profit by providing advisory and other services to the fund, with returns 
growing as the fund grows in size.15 The fund itself is often a corporation 
(though it may be an investment trust or some other form of business 
organization) chartered under state law, managed by or under the director 
 13. See Spitzer Says Advisers Overcharged Funds; Fund Boards Breached Duty to Shareholders, 
36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 189 (Feb. 2, 2004). 
 14. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
 15. See ROBERT C. POZEN, THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 13–14 (2d ed. 2002); see generally 
TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: MUTUAL 
FUNDS AND ADVISERS (2d. ed. 2004). External management is not the only structure on which the fund 
industry can be based, nor necessarily the best one. See John C. Bogle, Re-mutualizing the Mutual 
Fund Industry—The Alpha and the Omega, 45 B.C. L. REV. 391 (2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of its own board of directors. The sponsor—playing the role of promoter 
in corporation law—chooses the initial board, which then enters into a 
management contract with the fund by which it provides advisory and 
other services (e.g., brokerage or custodial services) through one or more 
sponsor-owned entities. The fund, then, is externally managed, with few or 
no employees of its own. The main role of its board of directors is to 
negotiate and oversee the delegation to the sponsor. Commonly, the 
sponsor creates many individual funds, with differing investment 
objectives, having the same affiliations. 
External management, of course, makes the sponsor (the fund’s 
advisor) the focal point of regulatory concern. Conflicts of interest 
abound. Most obviously, because the advisor is typically paid its fee as a 
percentage of assets under management, there is an incentive to increase 
assets at shareholder expense even though increasing the size of the fund 
does not increase (and can sometimes decrease) returns to its investors.16 
The recent market timing and late trading scandals were just variations on 
this—the advisors allegedly acquiesced in these activities by hedge funds 
and others in order to gain or keep other “sticky” assets from those 
investors.17 Another conflict comes from the large stream of brokerage 
commission income paid by the fund to an affiliate, which may not be 
negotiated at arm’s length.18 
Concern about the potential for conflicts was a primary motivation for 
the large-scale federalization of mutual fund regulation that occurred in 
1940.19 While Congress retained state chartering of investment companies 
(and hence a residual layer of regulation under state corporate law), mutual 
funds became subject to a unique and detailed regulatory scheme under the 
direction of the SEC that departed considerably from traditional patterns 
of state law.20 Perhaps most striking was section 17’s near-absolute 
prohibition on self-dealing transactions except as approved by the SEC, 
 16. See Joseph Chen et al., Does Fund Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of 
Liquidity and Organization, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1276 (2004). 
 17. See Eric Zitzewitz, Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-proofing Mutual Funds, 19 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 245 (2003). 
 18. See Susan Pulliam & Gregory Zuckerman, SEC Examines Rebates Paid To Large Funds, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2005, at C1; Adviser Group’s Study Finds Costs Disclosed by Funds Understate 
“True Costs,” 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 199 (Feb. 2, 2004). 
 19. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 222–29 (rev. ed. 2003). 
 20. There was also a political element to the development of the ’40 Act. For a while, at least, its 
strict regulation of the investment company industry stunted the growth of concentrated pools of 
investment capital, something that corporate officers and directors, commercial banks, and others 
would find to their liking. See Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund 
Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1469 (1991). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/4
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rejecting the “fairness” standard that dominates in state corporate law.21 
Independent directors became mandatory, with an explicit statutory 
definition of disinterestedness.22  
As originally enacted, section 36 of the ’40 Act contained a prohibition 
against breaches of fiduciary duty involving “gross misconduct or gross 
abuse of trust” by those in a position to exploit mutual fund investors, 
particularly the fund’s advisor.23 In response to a series of studies of 
continuing problems in the fund industry, Congress made major changes 
to the ’40 Act in 1970, specifically revising section 36 by adding an 
express private right of action under new subsection (b) to remedy 
breaches of duty involving compensation and fees paid by the mutual fund 
to affiliated parties.24 Section 36(a) was also revised, making it easier to 
reach other fiduciary breaches by simply requiring that they involve 
“personal misconduct.”25 The legislation did not provide for an explicit 
private right under subsection (a), but the available legislative history 
seemed supportive of judicial implication—which at the time was 
commonplace throughout the federal securities laws.26 For the most part, 
courts took this as enough to justify an implied right under section 36(a), 
although the matter is now heavily contested.27 
Section 36 is not the only private litigation weapon designed to combat 
breaches of fiduciary duties.28 The securities laws are filled with antifraud 
provisions, and as is by now familiar, the line between fraud and breach of 
fiduciary duty is extremely blurred.29 When a fiduciary duty exists, there is 
an affirmative duty to disclose. Because mutual fund advisors are plainly 
fiduciaries in the eyes of the law and their actions almost always touch on 
the purchase or sale of securities, plaintiffs have the ability to invoke cases 
 21. For an analysis, see CLARK, supra note 10, at 188–89. 
 22. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1067–70 (4th 
ed. 2004). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 80(a). 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(b). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(a). 
 26. On this background, see Arthur S. Gabinet & George M. Gowen III, The Past and Future of 
Implied Causes of Action Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 3 VILL. J.L. & INVESTMENT 
MGMT. 45 (2001–2002). 
 27. See infra notes 51–56 and accompanying text. 
 28. For an overview of the wide range of claims being made by plaintiffs in the late 
trading/market timing litigation, see James Benedict & Mary Dukla, Recent Developments in 
Litigation Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, in PLI INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE 
2004: A SEMINAR FOR ’40 ACT LAWYERS (2004). 
 29. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of 
Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2001); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, 
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 
(2003). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1017 Langevoort book pages.doc 4/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1022 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
like United States v. O’Hagan30 and SEC v. Zandford31 as ways of turning 
hidden breaches of fiduciary duty into securities fraud.32 And because 
mutual funds are constantly making public distributions of their own 
securities, the Securities Act of 193333 (the “’33 Act”)—with its potent 
express rights of action under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) for material 
misstatements or actionable omissions—applies as well. Plaintiffs make 
much in their market timing and late trading allegations of potential 
misrepresentations in mutual fund disclosures regarding fund policies with 
respect to quick redemptions, for good reason. Upon a showing of an 
actionable misrepresentation, the ’33 Act provisions are especially 
plaintiff-friendly on matters of state of mind, reliance and causation. 
Specifically within the ’40 Act, plaintiffs can also by-pass section 36 if 
they like and ask the court to imply a right of action directly under some 
other section, such as (in the recent scandals) section 22 and rule 22c-1, 
dealing with mutual fund pricing in sales and redemptions.34 
Without necessarily being critical of such uses in private litigation, 
they are all indirect mechanisms for seeking relief that is founded on a 
breach of fiduciary duty, whereas section 36 has as its subject the problem 
of remedying the fiduciary breach. These litigation alternatives often have 
the troubling effect of limiting recovery to purchasers or sellers rather than 
holders and of making the fund itself the primary defendant, either as the 
issuer of the securities or author of the disclosure, rather than as the 
breacher.35 To be sure, doctrines of controlling person liability, 
indemnification and contribution might ultimately shift the burden to the 
real wrongdoer, but not until after the fund and its investors have incurred 
substantial transaction costs. My focus is mainly on section 36 because it 
gets right to the point, against the right party. 
 30. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (insider trading under the so-called 
“misappropriation theory”). 
 31. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) (breach of fiduciary duty in brokerage context). 
 32. In the PIMCO case, an SEC enforcement proceeding, the court doubted whether a concealed 
breach by itself would constitute fraud, and hence emphasized the affirmative misrepresentation aspect 
of the claims. See SEC v. PIMCO Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). The court was mistaken in its reading of the law. The court did readily accept the applicability 
of Section 36(a), which does not require a showing of fraud. Id. at 471–72. 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 77. 
 34. Another avenue that plaintiffs have explored is to seek rescission of contracts with the 
fiduciary, along with ancillary relief, under section 47 of the Investment Company Act or section 415 
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, taking advantage of the very broad articulation of fiduciary 
obligations imposed on advisers in the case law. See H. Norman Knickle, The Investment Company 
Act of 1940: SEC Enforcement and Private Actions, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 777, 843–46 
(2004). 
 35. See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 177. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/4
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A. Section 36(b) 
As noted earlier, section 36(b) creates an express private right of action 
(as well as enabling the SEC to bring suit) with respect to breaches of 
fiduciary duty involving “the receipt of compensation for services, or of 
payments of a material nature, paid by [the fund or its shareholders] to 
such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment 
adviser.”36 Subsection (1) makes clear that the breach need not involve 
personal misconduct, in contrast to section 36(a). 
One interpretive issue involves the dividing line between the two 
subsections. Many of the difficulties for plaintiffs that we are about to see 
under subsection (a) are avoidable if an action can be brought under 
subsection (b), and arguably, many alleged breaches of fiduciary duty—
for example, late trading or market timing—relate to compensation or 
payments to the adviser because the motivation is to increase or preserve 
the adviser’s income. The courts have not been consistent here, but many 
cases limit subsection (b) to matters directly related to payments from the 
fund to the adviser based on the problem of excessive fees because of 
adviser domination and control.37 
Nor are plaintiffs in clear sailing simply because they have situated 
their claim within subsection (b). The case law has struggled with 
plaintiffs’ burden of proof relating to what constitutes excessive or 
inappropriate compensation. The key case is Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch 
Asset Management Inc.,38 which reads enigmatically to say the least, but in 
the end takes a plainly pro-defendant approach. Plaintiffs challenged the 
advisory fee paid to Merrill Lynch by its massive money market fund as 
excessive.39 The district court dismissed on grounds that fees approved by 
independent directors are valid if deemed fair compared to fees charged by 
other advisers to similar funds.40 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that this was a foolish test.41 If the 
industry remains dominated by conflicts of interest, then excessive fees 
 36. See generally FRANKEL, supra note 15, § 12.03; William P. Rogers & James N. Benedict, 
Money Market Fund Management Fees: How Much is Too Much?, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059 (1982). 
 37. For an overview of the case law, see FRANKEL, supra note 15, § 34.03[C]; Benedict & 
Dukla, supra note 28. The concern regards the need to interpret section 36(b) so that it does not 
become a catch-all for mismanagement, see Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321 
(4th Cir. 2001) (limited to excessive fees); Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 147 F. Supp. 2d 318, 
328–30 (D.N.J. 2001), aff’d, 286 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 2002) (broader scope). 
 38. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt. Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 39. Id. at 925. 
 40. Id. at 926–27. 
 41. Id. at 927–28. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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will be the norm, and the norm should then not be made the benchmark for 
propriety.42 And throughout much of the opinion, the Second Circuit 
seems to concur, explaining how Congress was dissatisfied with 
governance practices and how the market does not work as an adequate 
check on overreaching.43 Yet the standard adopted by the court is very 
restrained, affording plaintiffs a remedy only when the fee “is so 
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the 
services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length 
bargaining.”44 This test resembles the state law test for corporate waste, 
even though the legislative history behind section 36(b) explicitly wanted 
something more than a waste test,45 signaling little promise of success on 
the merits. Obviously, the court was uncomfortable getting more deeply 
into the business of fee-setting on its own—it is indeed hard to devise a 
principled substantive basis for striking down a fee that is fully disclosed 
and not outside of industry norms.46 Since Gartenberg, predictably, 
plaintiffs have fared poorly in their attacks on fees and 12b-1 plans,47 
notwithstanding ample grounds for concern that both tend toward excess 
industry-wide.48  
B. Section 36(a) and Other Remedies for Fiduciary Breaches 
In contrast to subsection (b), section 36(a) extends to all breaches of 
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct, and hence is more likely to 
be invoked with respect to concealed breaches of duty. Some courts have 
construed the misconduct language to require some breach of the duty of 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 927–30. 
 44. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928. The court identified a series of six factors that could aid in this 
inquiry. Approval by disinterested directors is a factor, though not controlling. See FRANKEL, supra 
note 15, § 12.03[D-E]. 
 45. See S. REP. NO. 91–184, at 15–16 (1969). The legislative history does make clear that 
judicial oversight is not to operate as a form of rate regulation, and that the main issue is to assure that 
the fee structure is revised periodically to reflect changes in asset size, etc. See Richard Phillips, 
Mutual Fund Independent Directors: A Model for Corporate America?, 9 Investment Company 
Institute Perspective, Aug. 2003, at 1, 10. 
 46. A court might insist on something like a reasoned justification of the fee in light of 
performance, services, costs, etc., and call into question supra-normal fees when no supra-normal 
performance or level of service can be articulated. 
 47. E.g., Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 48. For a useful collection of materials exploring the economics of the fund industry and nicely 
posing the questions involved in choosing market-based or regulation-based responses, see WILLIAM 
BAUMOL ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUAL FUND MARKETS: COMPETITION VERSUS REGULATION 
(1990). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/4
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loyalty,49 but others have been willing to extend it to egregious examples 
of failed oversight, so that culpably acquiescent directors can also be 
named as defendants.50 
There is a lively debate over whether there is an implied private right 
of action under section 36(a), or indeed, anywhere under the ’40 Act.51 
Until recently, courts plainly thought so,52 largely because of supportive 
language in the legislative history of 36(a) and the fact that its drafting 
occurred at a time when judicially implied private rights were 
commonplace.53 An immense amount of litigation under the ’40 Act has 
gone forward with little doubt about the viability of implied rights. But 
recently, taking a cue from more recent Supreme Court cases (particularly 
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver54), lower courts 
have begun to question whether the liberal implication is still 
sustainable—most notably, in the Second Circuit’s decision in Olmsted v. 
Pruco Life Insurance Co. of New Jersey.55 In the past year, a number of 
district courts have taken this as enough reason to overturn the decades of 
authority in favor of an implied right under section 36(a).56 
Because this involves a jurisprudential question far removed from my 
main subject, I do not want to climb into the implied rights thicket. As 
noted earlier, even if there is no implied right under the ’40 Act, it is not 
particularly hard to bring an action for a secret breach of fiduciary duty 
under Rule 10b-5, where an implied right is beyond question. The more 
relevant question is what form private litigation to enforce fiduciary duties 
takes, whether under section 36(a) or otherwise, which brings us to the 
problem of the derivative lawsuit. 
By and large, courts have found most claims of breach of fiduciary 
duty under the ’40 Act to be ones where the harm is to the fund rather than 
shareholders and hence must be brought derivatively,57 which is consistent 
 49. See, e.g., SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical, 410 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 50. See, e.g., Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 51. See, e.g., Gabinet & Gowen, supra note 26. 
 52. E.g., Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 53. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 54. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 55. Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of New Jersey, 283 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2002). Pruco, however, 
involved two statutory sections that were adopted in the 1990s, well after the Supreme Court had 
turned to a more restrictive approach. For an earlier expression of doubts about implication, albeit in 
dicta, see Boland v. Engle, 113 F.3d 706, 715 n.9 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 56. E.g., In re Eaton Vance Mut. Fund Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Mut. Funds 
Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Md. 2005); Chamberlain v. Aberdeen Asset Mgmt. Ltd., [2004–
2005 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 93,113 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 57. E.g., Strougo ex rel. Brazil Fund, Inc. v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). For a collection of the case law, see Benedict & Dukla, supra note 28. 
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with corporate law as generally understood. Specific cases may point 
otherwise: For example, in Strougo v. Bassini,58 the Second Circuit 
allowed a direct claim to proceed with respect to charges that a closed-end 
investment company’s directors authorized a dilutive rights offering that 
operated coercively on individual investors. That holding, too, seems right, 
but because of the plausible claim of coercion. Most breaches of duty 
(including late trading and market timing) will not have a similar impact.  
If a claim is derivative, then the interesting questions begin, all dealing 
with how much discretion the fund’s independent directors should have to 
take control of the suit away from the plaintiffs. The issue of demand on 
directors is the common entry portal to this issue. What are the standards 
for demand required or demand excused, and will special litigation 
committees of disinterested directors be able to settle or terminate the case 
over shareholder objections?59 Curiously, this is an area of securities law 
in which the Supreme Court has labored repeatedly in the last few 
decades. Two of those cases, though understandable on their facts, have 
set the law on a questionable course. 
The first was Burks v. Lasker,60 an action arising out of a mutual fund’s 
purchase of Penn Central commercial paper just before its insolvency. A 
derivative suit was brought on a number of grounds (though apparently not 
section 36(a)), and the question was whether the fund’s disinterested 
directors had the power to terminate the lawsuit.61 The Second Circuit said 
no, adopting a federal per se rule.62 The Supreme Court treated the 
question as one of choice of law,63 and held—crucially—that ’40 Act 
claims touching on corporate governance should look to state law where 
the matter is not specifically addressed in the Act or its rules.64 In other 
words, there is no federal common law of corporations for mutual funds.65 
The Court thus held that the law of the state of incorporation applies to 
permit termination in a given case except to the extent that the particular 
state law rule is inconsistent with the policies underlying the ’40 Act.66 
Because the lower court had made no state law determination, the case 
 58. Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 59. For a more extensive discussion of the case law on this issue, see FRANKEL, supra note 15, 
§ 34.07[G]. 
 60. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
 61. Id. at 473. 
 62. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 63. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 475 (1979). 
 64. Id. at 478, 486. 
 65. Id. at 477–78. 
 66. Id. at 486. 
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was remanded for further proceedings.67 But the Court made clear that it 
expected that the disinterested directors would be given a substantial role: 
“[I]t would have been paradoxical for Congress to have been willing to 
rely largely upon ‘watchdogs’ to protect shareholder interests and yet, 
where the ‘watchdogs’ have done precisely that, require that they be 
totally muzzled.”68 
The other deferential Supreme Court case came a little more than a 
decade later, in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.69 In a 
procedurally odd setting, plaintiffs brought a proxy rule-based complaint 
derivatively against the fund’s adviser, again without making any demand 
on the fund’s directors.70 Burks notwithstanding, the Seventh Circuit drew 
from the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance to 
impose a federal “universal demand” requirement, which it invoked to 
dismiss the suit.71 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court reversed, repeating 
that state law presumptively controls—in essence, that futility can 
sometimes excuse demand.72 Thus, Maryland law would have to be 
consulted to determine its approach to demand futility, and that doctrine 
would be respected unless inconsistent with the ’40 Act’s philosophy. 
Again, there was remand.73 
Neither holding is itself necessarily all that troubling—neither ever 
explicitly addresses the more important question of what posture toward 
director termination of derivative suits is consistent with the policies of the 
’40 Act. What is surprising, however, especially in Kamen but also in 
Burks, is the reverential tone with respect to state law on such a crucial 
question of mutual fund governance. After all, so much of the ’40 Act 
rests on a repudiation of the traditional protections of state corporate law.74 
But the language of the opinions speaks of the virtues of certainty and 
predictability from looking to state law, without much hint of doubt about 
the underlying political choices. 
 67. Id. at 486. 
 68. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 (1979). 
 69. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
 70. Id. at 93–94. 
 71. Id. at 94–95. 
 72. Id. at 98–99. 
 73. On remand, the complaint was dismissed. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 939 F.2d 
458 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 74. See Meyer Eisenberg & Richard M. Phillips, Mutual Fund Litigation—New Frontiers for the 
Investment Company Act, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 73 (1962). In an old but well known case, Levitt v. 
Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), the First Circuit had approached demand futility from the 
standpoint of the ’40 Act’s skepticism about mutual fund governance. 
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It is thus tempting to put the two cases in the same conservative, 
federalism-laden vein as better known decisions of the period, like Santa 
Fe v. Green75 under Rule 10b-5. But Burks was written by Justice Brennan 
and Kamen by Justice Marshall, and these were the Court’s two leading 
liberals. At least Kamen’s infatuation with state law may largely be the 
product of a misimpression—the opinion seems to assume that universal 
demand was starkly anti-plaintiff, so that fund shareholders were the 
happy beneficiaries of the Court’s ruling. In fact, the ALI rule invoked by 
the Seventh Circuit was more a way of trivializing demand, shifting 
substantive attention to the merits of any subsequent effort by the directors 
to terminate. While the ALI approach to that question was something of a 
compromise,76 it called for more thorough judicial review than that 
afforded in many states—including, as we shall shortly see, Maryland.  
Kamen’s main effect, then, was to move the crucial question back to 
the states with a strong hint to accept whatever outcome state law 
generates. To be sure, the ’40 Act “check” first articulated in Burks still 
applies. However, the admiring tone toward state law corporate 
governance solutions was unlikely to prompt much judicial skepticism. 
And that is precisely what has happened, well illustrated by the recent 
Second Circuit decision in Scalisi v. Fund Asset Management, L.P.77 
Plaintiffs brought a case under section 36(a) and other provisions against 
Merrill Lynch’s Fund Assent Management Company, advisor to the 
Merrill Lynch Focus Twenty Fund, based on purchases of Enron stock for 
the fund portfolio.78 They refused to make demand on futility grounds, 
claiming that the fund directors were controlled persons because they 
served on forty-nine Merrill fund boards, collecting between $160,000 and 
$260,000 in annual fees.79 Plaintiffs argued that the ’40 Act test for 
disinterestedness should apply for determining when directors lack the 
 75. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 76. See John C. Coffee Jr., New Myths and Old Realities: The American Law Institute Faces the 
Derivative Action, 48 BUS. LAW. 1407 (1993). 
 77. Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 78. Id. at 136. 
 79. Id. at 136. This type of claim about disinterested directors is frequently raised by plaintiffs, 
without much success. See Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001); see 
also Benedict & Dukla, supra note 28. Reacting to such criticisms, the SEC has required greater 
disclosure about multi-board service, but has not actually taken the position that such persons are 
controlled, and hence disinterested. In response to a district court case, Strougo ex rel. Brazil Fund, 
Inc. v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), that called the independence 
of such directors into question, Maryland revised its corporation law statute to provide that a director 
deemed disinterested under the ’40 Act would be deemed independent under Maryland law. See 
FRANKEL, supra note 15, § 34.07[G], at 34–143. 
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independence to enable them to fairly evaluate the derivative suit.80 The 
Second Circuit rejected the argument, finding that Maryland law 
controlled on all issues relating to demand futility.81 It then applied the 
severe test set forth by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Werbowsky v. 
Collomb,82 making the question turn on whether “‘a majority of the 
directors are so personally and directly conflicted or committed to the 
decision in dispute that they cannot reasonably be expected to respond to a 
demand in good faith and within the ambit of the business judgment 
rule.’”83 Although this only dealt with demand rather than a subsequent 
decision to terminate, the Maryland court was clear as to the latter as well: 
When demand is required, a decision by the board to reject the demand 
and terminate the litigation would be tested under the business judgment 
rule.84 
What is jarring about Scalisi and similar cases, of course, is that the 
analysis contains nothing about the ’40 Act’s philosophy about corporate 
governance, which both Burks and Kamen said is the check on the 
otherwise automatic incorporation of state law.85 The Scalisi plaintiffs had 
a reasonable methodological point: if state law has to cohere with the ’40 
Act approach, then the ’40 Act test for disinterestedness should at least be 
informative, if not compelling. At the very least, a fresh look at the federal 
philosophy of mutual fund governance on as important and controversial a 
question as the termination of derivative suits was in order. That the 
Werbowsky approach was deliberately more limited (and hence defendant-
friendly) than the “reasonable doubt” approach used by Delaware courts86 
might have at least caused the Second Circuit to wonder whether the ’40 
Act philosophy sets limits on deferring to the board’s preferences about 
the lawsuit when a serious claim of breach of fiduciary duty is made. 
The unsatisfying nature of the inquiry is underscored by looking at a 
third Supreme Court decision dealing with demand requirements in mutual 
fund litigation, Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox.87 At issue in Fox was 
whether there was a demand requirement under section 36(b), the express 
 80. Id. at 139. 
 81. Id. at 139–40. 
 82. Werbowsky v. Collomb, 766 A.2d 123 (Md. 2001). 
 83. Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werbowsky, 
766 A.2d at 144). The court described this as an “extremely limited” inquiry, pointing specifically to 
the dangers that derivative litigation can pose to the corporation. Werbowsky, 766 A.2d at 144. 
 84. Werbowsky, 766 A.2d at 144. 
 85. Kemper v. Kamen Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1990); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 
484–85 (1979). 
 86. E.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 87. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984). 
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right of action for compensation-related breaches of fiduciary duty.88 The 
Court said no, largely by reference to text and legislative history.89 In 
exploring that history, the Court recounted legislative doubts leading up to 
the 1970 amendments about whether disinterested directors could really be 
counted on as a check on excessive fees and other compensation.90 Hence 
it was reasonable to draft the statute in a way that would allow the private 
litigation to go forward without any director control.91 
While one could read this as limited to litigation about fees, the point is 
really a broader one. If Congress in 1970 thought directors were weak 
enough links in the governance process that shareholder litigation 
regarding fees and compensation should bypass them, it is not 
immediately obvious why the same skepticism would not be appropriate in 
non-fee cases alleging personal misconduct. Although Burks seemingly 
forecloses complete disregard of board judgment in non-36(b) cases, the 
embedded ’40 Act philosophy would seem to call for some meaningful 
review of a board’s decision to terminate—not the opposite extreme of 
business judgment deference. 
II. A CRITIQUE OF DEFERENCE IN THE MUTUAL FUND AREA 
A. The Blending of Mutual Fund and Corporate Law 
As noted earlier, one obvious hypothesis for why the case law evolved 
toward a deferential posture is that courts came to see mutual funds as 
business corporations (or equivalent entities) and joined into the same 
spirit that intellectually dominated the late 1970s through the 1990s—the 
belief that market forces provide a stronger and more efficient discipline 
on corporate behavior than strong legal intervention, justifying deference. 
In this view, the competition for charters drives state law toward 
optimality, a discipline not at work at the federal level.92 Burks and Kamen 
especially are less about the unique features of mutual funds and very 
much about general principles of corporate governance, drawing heavily 
from the prevailing thought of the time. This federalist, anti-regulatory 
genre was at an intellectual peak at the end of the 1980s: Consider that 
Kamen was decided in 1991, contemporaneous with other judicial tributes 
 88. Id. at 524. 
 89. Id. at 534, 536. 
 90. Id. at 538–41. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).  
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to managerial autonomy, such as Business Roundtable v. SEC93 on 
shareholder voting rights (1990) and the Delaware Supreme Court’s Time-
Warner decision (1989),94 which eschewed any serious judicial inquiry 
into takeover defensive tactics designed to preserve a chosen business 
strategy. 
If so, there are two justifiable reactions. The first is that even with 
respect to corporate law generally, the romanticism of the markets has 
faded, and concern about excessive managerial power in the absence of 
legal intervention has resurfaced. The “race to the top” hypothesis is more 
heavily contested than it was fifteen years ago,95 in favor of a more 
ambiguous vision built on path dependency in which the only potential 
check on Delaware’s autonomy is the sometimes serious (but usually not) 
threat of federal intervention.96 If the mutual fund case law is still being 
influenced by a vision in which corporate federalism is an unqualified 
matter of faith, then that is reason enough to reconsider. 
The second is more fundamental: Mutual funds are not enough like 
business corporations for there to be any more than a facile analogy. Any 
plausible theory of effective market discipline in corporate law generally 
rests on some combination of the following: an efficient capital 
marketplace that prices both good and bad corporate governance with 
reasonable precision; compensation of key insiders using stock or options, 
so as to better align the interests of managers and investors; the emerging 
power of institutional investors who can actually threaten to exercise their 
voting rights; and a reasonably active market for corporate control. 
Without passing judgment on the sufficiency of any of these in the world 
of corporations—each is contestable there as well, as the contemporary 
corporate law literature points out—the simple fact is that none even 
arguably operates with any power in the world of mutual funds. Because 
mutual funds are not traded in an organized market, arbitrage opportunities 
cannot work to keep prices in line with rational expectations.97 Mutual 
fund prices are simply the product of net asset value at the time of 
purchase or redemption. Insider compensation is largely based on assets as 
well, which creates the conflict rather than aligns insider-shareholder 
 93. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking down SEC rule 19c-4 as an 
undue interference with state primacy in corporate governance). 
 94. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 95. E.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002). 
 96. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003). 
 97. See Edwin J. Elton et al., Are Investors Rational? Choices Among Index Funds, 59 J. FIN. 
261 (2004). 
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interests, and directors are typically paid all or mostly in cash. Institutional 
shareholder voice does not exist in the fund area, and there is no external 
market for corporate control at all because shareholders can only sell their 
shares back to the fund. Thinking about mutual funds by imagining them 
simply as a species of “corporations” in a way that is directly informed by 
contemporary corporate law theory is completely misguided. 
B. The Convergence of Capital and Product Markets 
However, that there is not a good analogy between business 
corporations and mutual funds does not mean that there might not be some 
alternative market-based mechanism that justifies a comparable skepticism 
about the need for intensive federal regulation. Critics of ’40 Act-style 
regulation are on firmer ground in arguing that, because mutual fund 
shares are continually being offered and redeemed, investors impose an 
even more direct and powerful discipline than in corporations generally. 
This convergence of the capital and product marketplaces, they would say, 
means that any fund adviser seeking to increase assets will have to offer an 
attractive bundle of skillful portfolio management and credible shareholder 
protections lest it lose in the marketplace to higher quality competitors.98  
This, of course, is not an argument against any need for law or in favor 
of complete director autonomy.99 As in any market that might suffer from 
a “lemons” problem, there is always the possibility of concealed 
opportunism: Funds will emerge that mimic others but cheat, or once-
respectable funds will find that they can no longer successfully compete in 
the market and try some last-period strategy built on deception to milk the 
assets that remain. In a highly competitive marketplace characterized by 
ease of entry, policing for deceptive misbehavior is still important. But 
competition gives the fund ample incentive to use corporate governance as 
a bonding mechanism to find new investor money and keep the money it 
has under management, so that residual regulation need not be heavy-
handed, and presumably the states would compete to offer efficient 
mechanisms to help high quality funds credibly overcome the lemons 
problem. In other words, the kind of state law-oriented, deferential 
 98. See BAUMOL, supra note 48. 
 99. See Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment 
Management Treaties, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1981). Obviously, there must be some mechanism to 
prevent the misappropriation of funds or excessively risky behavior—something common to the 
regulation of all financial institutions. 
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approach we have seen from the case law would be quite plausible if the 
basic market discipline works. 
For the discipline to operate, however, the product market must be 
rational, with mutual fund investors looking out for their own interests 
with reasonable diligence. Diligence would not necessarily be required 
from every investor: conventional economic analysis teaches that the less 
sophisticated consumer will be protected so long as the producer realizes 
that it must persuade enough sophisticated consumers to purchase the 
same product. The theory does not work, however, if the market can be 
segmented with similar but different products, with inferior products being 
marketed to the less sophisticated.100 In contrast to an organized trading 
market, as noted earlier, there is no opportunity for arbitrage, so that smart 
money alone cannot correct any mispricing.  
Questions about consumer decision-making are empirical and there is 
now enough data on mutual fund investor behavior to gain some useful 
insight. Inquiries into the relationship between mutual fund costs and 
returns to investors have produced what Paul Mahoney calls “discomfiting 
results.”101 Higher costs do not translate into any obvious advantages to 
investors—several studies show a negative relationship between returns 
and both fees and trading expenses.102 Much of this research is an 
outgrowth of the most robust finding in the market efficiency literature: 
that market-beating strategies are hard to find or sustain, and those who 
pay for above-average performance are likely to be disappointed should 
they ever come to understand their results.103 To be sure, investors may be 
gaining utility through other features of the mutual fund investment, such 
as good custodianship and record-keeping, asset allocation or retirement 
 100. See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 168–69. 
 101. Id. at 169; see also Ronald Wilcox, Bargain Hunting or Star Gazing? How Consumers 
Choose Mutual Funds, 76 J. BUS. L. 645 (2003). 
 102. E.g., Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 51 
J. FIN. 783 (1996); Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991, 
50 J. FIN. 549 (1995). 
 103. Survey evidence suggests that investors have misguided beliefs about the relationship 
between costs and performance; some eighty percent believe that higher costs typically generate better 
returns. See Gordon J. Alexander et al., Mutual Fund Shareholders: Characteristics, Investor 
Knowledge and Sources of Information, 7 FIN. SERV. REV. 301 (1998). For an interesting social 
psychology study suggesting that even fairly sophisticated investors do not have a good understanding 
of even their historical returns from mutual fund investments, see Don A. Moore et al., Positive 
Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 95 (1999). Recent evidence does suggest that mutual funds may have 
superior stock picking ability but that the positive abnormal returns are not passed on to investors once 
transaction costs and expenses are taken into account. See Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance: 
An Empirical Decomposition into Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses, 55 J. 
FIN. 1655 (2000). 
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planning advice, even if returns themselves are not abnormal. But there is 
no good evidence that these benefits correlate with expenses any better 
than returns do.  
This leads to the suspicion that the market for mutual funds is indeed 
segmented into more and less sophisticated consumer groups, with funds 
(or even classes within the same fund) with different quality attributes 
appealing to different segments.104 One rough division is between no-load 
funds and funds sold by brokers, which tend to have heavy distribution 
expenses. A recent study by Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano105 looked 
at a number of differences between the two groups and found that broker-
sold funds—purchased by those self-identified as preferring to rely on the 
advice of trained professionals—falling short on most all dimensions: 
The bulk of our evidence fails to identify tangible advantages of the 
broker channel. In the broker channel, consumers pay extra 
distribution fees to buy funds with higher non-distribution fee 
expenses. The funds they buy underperform those in the direct 
channel even before deductions of any distribution related 
expenses. . . . [They] exhibit no superior asset allocation. . . . 
Finally, realized flows of money into individual funds appear to 
flow into funds with larger front end loads. . . .106 
While the authors cannot eliminate the possibility of some other offsetting 
utility gains apart from returns, the more likely explanation is some 
combination of investor ignorance and potent salesmanship by the brokers. 
Other empirical evidence points in the same direction. For example, as 
the SEC has long feared, there is strong evidence of trend-chasing by 
mutual fund investors, that is, buying funds with strong recent 
performance,107 even though there is little reason to suspect the hot hand to 
 104. See Elton et al., supra note 97. Ronald Wilcox, supra note 101, surprisingly suggests that 
errors are particularly frequent among those from whom it might least be expected: higher-educated, 
higher-income groups, including those with above-average knowledge of basic financial principles. 
 105. Daniel Bergstresser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund 
Industry (Mar. 15, 2005) (working paper, Harvard Business School), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=616981. 
 106. Id. at 33. The point here is simply a descriptive one—that the market for mutual fund shares 
exhibits suboptimal rationality, especially in certain market channels. It is not meant to suggest abuse: 
One could well argue that paying brokers to sell shares (even inferior ones) to less sophisticated 
investors is better than leaving those investors to their own choices, or to choices driven by sellers of 
other investment products (e.g., insurance, bank products, or affinity programs) that would leave them 
even worse off. 
 107. See Prem C. Jain & Joanna Shuang Wu, Truth in Mutual Fund Advertising: Evidence on 
Future Performance and Fund Flows, 55 J. FIN. 937 (2000); Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly 
Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589 (1998). 
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continue for more than a brief period of time, at best.108 Not surprisingly, 
this is especially so with brokered fund purchases, but operates in both 
segments, which in turn invites various forms of opportunism. For 
example, advertising can readily distort decisions by investors already 
inclined to overweight recent performance.109 Window dressing occurs at 
the end of quarters, just before public reporting, to embellish results.110 
Funds that lag their competitors in the tournament for new money engage 
in riskier portfolio behavior in an effort to catch up.111 The SEC has 
noticed the practice of creating many new funds with small initial 
capitalization.112 A few are bound to be lucky and their performance is 
thereupon heavily advertised; the remainders are quietly merged into other 
funds.  
That new money is sensitive to recent performance is not all bad, even 
if it suggests trend-chasing behavior—at least good performance by fund 
managers is rewarded, a key to any marketplace discipline. Unfortunately, 
the performance sensitivity is asymmetric.113 Money does not exit poorly 
performing funds with the same velocity, meaning that laggards are likely 
to have money from which to take abnormally high fees and other 
expenses for some time. The final period problem, discussed earlier, can 
last for quite a while even if a fund is persistently inferior.  
Given this, there is ample reason to doubt the sensitivity of the mutual 
fund market to subtle or difficult-to-interpret information. In a direct test 
of these doubts, Barber, Odean, and Zheng study differences in fund flows 
as between sales loads and operating expenses.114 On average, investors 
appear to have learned to avoid high sales loads (i.e., there is a net outflow 
from such finds, all other things being equal). On the other hand, there is, 
if anything, a “perverse” positive relationship between fund flows and 
high operating expenses. They attribute this to the advertising purchased 
 108. See Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57 (1997). 
 109. See, e.g., Jain & Wu, supra note 107. 
 110. Cf. James Lakonishok et al., Window Dressing by Pension Fund Managers, 81 AM. ECON. 
REV. 227 (1991). 
 111. See Keith C. Brown et al., Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial 
Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry, 51 J. FIN. 85 (1996). 
 112. See In re Van Kampen Inv. Advisory Corp., Investment Act Release No. 23,996, [1999–2000 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,203 (Sept. 8, 1999). 
 113. See Gruber, supra note 102; Richard A. Ippolito, Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor 
Quality: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry, 35 J.L. & ECON. 45 (1992). For a discussion of 
why, see William N. Goetzmann & Nadav Peles, Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual Fund Investors, 
20 J. FIN. RES. 145 (1997). 
 114. Brad M. Barber et al., Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Effects of Expenses on Mutual Fund 
Flows, 78 J. BUS. 2095 (2005). 
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by distribution fees and to consumers’ difficulties in processing more 
subtle cost information. 
No doubt more work than this is necessary to understand the mutual 
fund market thoroughly, but what we know about the marketplace 
suggests that a belief that regulation beyond disclosure is unnecessary 
because mutual fund investors carefully look out for their own interests is 
misplaced. Serious agency cost problems remain.115 And if the market 
check is suboptimal, the conditions will be not present to make fund 
promoters choose legal regimes or corporate governance practices that 
align with investor interests so as to operate as a “race to the top.” Choice 
of directors and other practices are exceedingly subjective and hard to 
evaluate. And if this is so, the demand by funds for high quality law to 
make claims of shareholder protection more credible will be low. 
This by itself counsels against undue reliance either on state law or 
“disinterested” directors chosen, explicitly or implicitly, by fund sponsors. 
State law will likely cater to sponsor interests, not to the degree of no 
investor protection at all—that might be enough to generate adverse 
investor reaction—but to a balance decidedly tilted toward generating 
returns for the sponsors through impression management rather than 
rigorous controls. The fact that two states, Maryland and Massachusetts, 
dominate the incorporation business for mutual funds is troublesome under 
this hypothesis, and we have already seen Maryland’s choice of policy in 
the derivative litigation setting. 
C. The Ideology of Product Market Competition 
In a widely noted op-ed piece responding to the mutual fund scandals 
entitled What Mutual Fund Scandal?, Henry Manne argued that the matter 
was seriously overblown: Mutual fund investors care deeply about total 
returns, and fiduciary breaches that diminish returns within the time 
horizons of the typical investor will be punished by a highly competitive 
market.116 Yet we have just seen that, descriptively, there is reason to 
doubt the market’s sensitivity to either questionable performance or subtle 
opportunism. 
 115. In addition to fees and expenses, there is evidence that investors are insensitive to money 
paid to brokerage affiliates at seemingly above-market rates. See Miles Livingston & Edward S. 
O’Neal, Mutual Fund Brokerage Commissions, 19 J. FIN. RES. 273 (1996); Mahoney, supra note 1, at 
172. 
 116. Henry G. Manne, What Mutual Fund Scandal?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2004, at A22. For a 
criticism, see Mahoney, supra note 1, at 176, pointing out that hidden opportunism is inconsistent with 
rational investor protection even if the costs are captured in disclosed total returns. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/4
p1017 Langevoort book pages.doc 4/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] PRIVATE LITIGATION TO ENFORCE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 1037 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We need only tweak Manne’s claim slightly, however, to capture 
something slightly different and, to many, more persuasive. As a 
normative claim, Manne may be read to say that the information about 
how the funds are managed is available for investors to use as they wish. If 
investors fail to exercise diligence that seems to comport with common 
sense (or if they rationally fail to respond to problems that have only small 
dollar effects on their investments), there is no reason to treat it as a 
serious moral or regulatory failure on the supply side. The mutual fund 
industry has a high degree of transparency, and transparency is all that 
regulation should seek in marketplace transactions. 
My aim is not to contest this normative judgment. For my purposes, it 
is enough to acknowledge the obvious: that many people genuinely accept 
a conservative, anti-paternalistic vision of consumer responsibility.117 
Within this belief system, the fair test of a product is consumer acceptance 
in the absence of serious deceit. And mutual fund investments are 
products—no different, really, from health care, insurance, bank deposits, 
residential real estate, and other important settings where consumers are 
often less than diligent. In fact, because of securities regulation and the 
sophistication of the financial media, the transparency in the mutual fund 
area is probably superior to that for most of those other important 
household decisions.  
My first hypothesis is that this ideology has been internalized by the 
mutual fund industry. Whether this is a self-serving inference or not is less 
important than where the inference leads. The key point is this: Once the 
mutual fund is viewed as a product to be marketed within liberal societal 
expectations as to fair advertising like any other, then any notion that the 
producer is a “fiduciary” is awkward and disorienting.118 The transaction is 
instead simply embedded in the morals of the marketplace.119 To be sure, 
the law disagrees—the adviser is deemed a fiduciary to the fund and its 
investors. From a business standpoint, however, the law’s move makes 
 117. Such beliefs seem to relate to a broader set of political and ideological values. On the 
correlation between political ideology and critical attitudes toward cognitive bias as an explanation for 
suboptimal behavior, see Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both 
the Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 293 (2000).  
 118. This problem exists in many areas where the expectations of law may conflict with the self-
conceptions in a certain line of business. For a collection of such settings, see generally DEBORAH A. 
DEMOTT, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: DUTIES IN ONGOING BUSINESS 
RELATIONSHIPS (1991). The broker-dealer field is a good example. See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling 
Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and 
Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996). 
 119. While marketing efforts often portray funds and their sponsors as committed to a trust-based 
relationship, adherents treat that as common puffery, not an enforceable representation. 
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little sense. We do not engage in the same principal-agent fiction in most 
other products of similar significance (consider bank deposits or insurance 
policies). The analogy from the world of corporations, where the idea of 
investor ownership has at least some intellectual purchase, does not follow 
because that is premised on a collective lock-in of equity capital that is not 
present in mutual funds.120 Exit is simple. Thus, those inside the fund 
industry are more likely to act out the law’s demands as something of an 
exercise in formalism without seeing much in the way of realism or 
legitimacy. In fact, in the 1980s, there were serious proposals to do away 
with the investor ownership model so as to bring the mutual fund’s legal 
structure closer to marketplace realities.121  
My second hypothesis is that independent directors of mutual funds 
will commonly share this normative vision based on consumer sovereignty 
and will be chosen because they do. If so, this has a subtle but important 
effect on how they self-define their roles as directors. If shareholders are 
responsible for their own choices, directors are less likely to feel obliged 
to act aggressively on their behalf. Net inflows of money are the proper 
metric for testing product quality, not the directors’ subjective impression 
of a fair price. That is to say, they do not see themselves as there to engage 
in serious bargaining with the sponsors as shareholder representatives, 
because that is not needed; that, in turn, absolves them from the otherwise 
uncomfortable exercise of serious fiduciary control.122 The shareholders 
can vote with their feet. In turn, consumer acceptance notwithstanding, 
unduly high fees or other forms of rent-seeking by the sponsor ratifies 
their relaxed approach. 
That would explain a good bit of the empirical and anecdotal data 
without at the same time buying into the extreme view that all outside 
directors are mere puppets dominated or controlled by fund sponsors. To 
those who accept the ideology of consumer sovereignty, the only thing 
that could justify bargaining down a fully-disclosed management or 12b-1 
 120. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003); Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000). 
 121. See Richard Phillips, Deregulation under the Investment Company Act—A Reevaluation of 
the Corporate Paraphernalia of Shareholder Voting and Boards of Directors, 37 BUS. LAW. 903 
(1982). More recently, Phillips has described the role of the independent director in a way that is very 
close to a consumer sovereignty model. See Phillips, supra note 45. 
 122. This plainly is the way those inside the industry view the directors’ role, which makes it 
likely that the director selection process will seek those who agree. For a good illustration of the 
tension between this vision and the stronger image of the director as the shareholders’ faithful 
bargaining agent, see Mercer E. Bullard, Context and Commentary, The Mutual Fund Summit, 73 
MISS. L.J. 1129, 1141–46 (2004) (describing panel discussion). 
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fee would be perceived consumer resistance, which as we have seen can 
often be overcome by good marketing.123 It can even provide the 
rationalization for using mutual fund assets for fairly aggressive 
distribution tactics. What to a critic might seem the exploitation of 
consumer biases becomes a means of differentiation from other financial 
products, including many products marketed with less consumer 
protection than mutual funds (e.g., insurance and bank products). High 
commissions paid to brokers are justified by the belief that without such 
tactics, consumers will make much worse decisions.124 Within this 
ideology, the role of the disinterested mutual fund director is fairly 
minimal: Act out some basic legal and regulatory formalities, and keep the 
fund and its adviser within rather expansive bounds of acceptable 
marketing practices.125  
When consumer acceptance becomes the only practicable measure of 
both legitimacy and success, the competitive impulses of the adviser are 
less likely to be checked. There is interesting psychological evidence that 
people feel more free to behave opportunistically once they have disclosed 
their conflicts of interest.126 Moreover, many fund sponsors are themselves 
publicly-traded companies or parts of large publicly-traded financial 
services firms. Pressures for sustained revenue and earnings growth in an 
extraordinarily competitive financial services market mean more 
marketing aggressiveness in the face of diminishing marginal returns. 
When careers depend on meeting increasingly unrealistic growth targets, 
fear of falling short often leads to one of two forms of cheating, if not 
both: deception in the product market and concealed opportunism 
 123. Good marketing, in turn, may be little more than providing high-powered incentives to 
brokers and other salespeople. See Edward S. O’Neal, Mutual Fund Share Classes and Broker 
Incentives, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1999, at 76. 
 124. See Bergstresser et al., supra note 105, at 11, noting that empirical studies of broker-sold 
funds cannot test against what the investor would have done in the absence of broker intervention. On 
similar thinking in the brokerage industry generally, see Langevoort, supra note 118. 
 125. The applicable norms in American society with respect to consumer purchases are fairly lax, 
of course. See, e.g., THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM, MARKET 
POPULISM AND THE END OF MARKET DEMOCRACY (2000); Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: 
The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75 
(1998). For a discussion of the ideology of consumer sovereignty in a legal context, see Jon D. Hanson 
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999); see also Douglas Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product 
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 584 (2004).  
 126. See Daylian Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts 
of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005). There are two effects. One is that the disclosure does not 
prompt an adequate form of self-protection, perhaps because the person to whom the disclosure is 
made takes the disclosure as evidence of good faith. The other is that the person making the disclosure 
feels greater moral freedom to act selfishly, now that the other person has been put on notice.  
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designed to find revenue sources to offset the shortfall.127 The late trading 
and market timing scandals fall into the latter category. There is no reason 
to believe that disinterested fund directors would desire, much less 
encourage, these behaviors. But by accepting the ideology of consumer 
acceptance as the measure of success, they contribute to an environment 
where such behaviors become more predictable. 
D. Watchdogs? 
If my suspicions are accurate, then we can draw some legal 
conclusions. It is not fair to say that the ’40 Act and the SEC have been 
wrong to invest regulatory resources in director independence. One can 
have relatively moderate expectations for the performance of disinterested 
directors and still believe that the strategy adds some value, and there is a 
body of evidence to support this.128 Research by Khorana, Tufano, and 
Wedge on merger decisions by fund boards is an example.129 When funds 
persistently generate poor returns for investors, the most practicable 
remedy is a merger into some other fund, where better returns may be 
more likely. The interesting question is how quickly boards make this 
decision. Although the results are discomfiting along a number of 
dimensions (e.g., higher paid boards are slower to react if the effect is to 
reduce director wealth), the main effect is that more independent boards—
most noticeably in the rare case when the board is entirely disinterested—
react somewhat faster and tolerate less underperformance. They read their 
results to suggest that outside directors are not anachronistic and might 
play some useful role, especially if strengthened. But again, the role here 
is one where the directors act in the face of obvious underperformance and 
hence a reduction or disappearance of net inflows. Consumerist directors 
are more likely to take that task fairly seriously even if they are not 
aggressive bargainers over fees and distribution expenses.  
My hypothesis thus acknowledges the plausibility of disinterested 
director control at the margins. So I would expect, for instance, that even 
in the absence of regulatory pressure, most fund directors would react to 
 127. See Brown et al., supra note 111, on the incentive pressures; see also Judith Chevalier & 
Glenn Ellison, Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1167 
(1997). 
 128. See Peter Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-setting in the U.S. Mutual 
Fund Industry, 46 J. FIN. ECON. 321 (1997). 
 129. Ajay Khorana et al., Board Structure, Mergers and Shareholder Wealth: A Study of the 
Mutual Fund Industry (Feb. 15, 2005) (working paper, Georgia Institute of Technology), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=621081. 
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the discovery that advisory personnel were deliberately permitting late 
trading to occur, an unambiguous violation of rule 22c-1. The problem 
arises when ambiguity exists, as with market timing, which has largely 
turned into a question of how quickly large investors should be allowed to 
redeem after their purchase.130 With respect to a subjective judgment like 
this, various forces go to work, familiar in the corporate law literature,131 
that can easily lead to a reaction like Manne’s: “What scandal?”132 To 
directors heavily invested in the consumer appeal of the mutual fund 
product, there is a temptation to rationalize subtly opportunistic behavior 
by fund insiders as tolerable because it is commonplace and ultimately 
reflected in the performance disclosed to fund investors. Investors’ failure 
to respond (i.e., continuing net inflows) then becomes proof that it is not 
that troubling. 
In the absence of some means of forcing on the industry disinterested 
directors whose ideology is fiduciary rather than consumerist—and merely 
making the board chairman independent or increasing the number of 
disinterested directors will not do this, even though both are positive 
steps—the more reasonable legal reaction is to keep expectations in check. 
Whatever the merits of the debate in corporate law generally, the 
influences in the mutual fund marketplace are too weak simply to presume 
that directors will act as faithful fiduciaries in the strong, legal sense of the 
term. The idea was well articulated by the Supreme Court in Fox, 
attributing to Congress the belief that the value of independent directors 
was such that a dual strategy made more sense: independence plus private 
fiduciary duty litigation under section 36(b) that is outside the control of 
those directors.133 Unfortunately, for whatever reasons, Burks and Kamen 
seem to have missed the message, leading to what we see in Scalisi. Not 
only is there a thoughtless abdication to state law but also undue deference 
to disinterested directors on the question of termination of derivative 
litigation under section 36(a). Again, it is hard to see how the approaches 
under subsections (a) and (b) square. 
 130. See Mercer E. Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund Arbitrage and 
the SEC’s Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). As Bullard 
points out, the market timing problem could better be addressed by revising the pricing process to 
eliminate stale prices. 
 131. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological 
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985); 
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended 
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001). 
 132. See supra note 116. 
 133. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
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On the specific question of director termination of derivative suits, 
then, the kind of deference we have seen is unwise. Because issues of 
demand and termination are closely bound up in fear of speculative 
litigation, courts might not want to abandon completely a mechanism that 
can serve to weed out frivolous suits.134 It would not be unreasonable for 
courts to decide that they would entertain motions to dismiss based on the 
recommendation of a special litigation committee of disinterested 
directors, but at the very least, that would warrant a reasonableness-based 
review related to the merits of plaintiffs’ complaint, not business judgment 
deference.135  
III. CONCLUSION 
The case law under section 36 poses an unfortunate number of 
obstacles to recovery, including undue deference to disinterested directors 
and the processes of corporate governance. The recent genre of case law 
has largely missed the point about the differences between mutual funds 
and business corporations (not to mention doubts about deference in 
corporations generally), differences that are a main reason we have federal 
legislation that adopts so different a posture with respect to the governance 
and management of mutual funds and other investment companies.  
The SEC probably bears some responsibility here for the enthusiasm 
with which it has embraced disinterested director responsibilities over the 
last two decades. The strategy, set in motion in the ’40 Act itself, is 
reasonable if seen as just that—a strategy rather than a solution. 
Predictably acting as if there was more promise in the strategy than there 
really is, however, the Commission made it easier for the courts to buy 
into the idea that disinterested directors were a dependable check, reducing 
the need for judicial oversight. As we have seen, the economics of the 
mutual fund marketplace do not justify that much faith. And if my 
hypothesis is right that most disinterested directors genuinely believe in a 
market-based rather than fiduciary-based definition of the director’s role, 
attention will mainly be focused on monitoring the consumer acceptability 
of the product. Such directors feel no duty to compensate for any flaws in 
the market by adopting an oppositional attitude toward the fund sponsors, 
fiduciary rhetoric notwithstanding. Under the market-based model, any 
interest in ethics is subsumed into either avoidance of legal sanction or 
 134. Note that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act does not apply to lawsuits brought 
under the ’40 Act. 
 135. See, e.g., Fink v. Codey (In re PSE & G Shareholder Litig.), 801 A.2d 295 (N.J. 2002). 
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loss of reputation from highly salient misconduct. That is not much unless 
the threat of legal sanction is serious and/or investors are attentive. 
Because consumer attentiveness increases mainly in response to law-
generated scandals, the prima facie case for judicial intervention to remedy 
fiduciary breaches—in which private litigation would seem to be a 
necessary component—seems strong.  
The obstacles that cases like Scalisi create encourage plaintiffs to look 
elsewhere for relief: rule 10b-5, the Securities Act, the rescissionary 
remedy under the Advisers Act, etc. But as noted earlier, this is unduly 
complicating and creates the likelihood of pocket-shifting in ways that 
probably hurt mutual fund investors more than help them. In 
compensatory terms, the victims of most fiduciary breaches are current 
fund shareholders and shareholders who have redeemed at prices lower 
than they would have been in the absence of the breach. Privileging traders 
over holders—which is the effect of class actions under the 10b-5 or the 
Securities Act—is not right. One could, of course, use rule 10b-5 
somewhat differently, by thinking of the fund itself (the seller) as the 
victim of a concealed fiduciary breach “coinciding” with purchases of 
fund shares.136 But that presumably takes the form of a derivative suit and 
so probably just brings us back to the troubling obstacles in the case law. 
The best response would be for courts to take a few steps back and 
correct for the overreaction in the direction of disinterestedness and the 
processes of governance, making derivative litigation a serviceable 
mechanism for serious judicial review in cases of fiduciary breach.137 Fox 
provides the justification in ’40 Act terms,138 and both Burks and Kamen 
did put in place the safety valve of consistency with the philosophy of the 
 136. See supra notes 29–32. The late trading and market-timing cases have a direct insider trading 
component to the extent that advisors passed on nonpublic information about a fund’s portfolio to 
outside investors to facilitate their timing activity. While a conventional insider trading case might be 
hard to maintain because the outsiders traded with the fund itself (which knew the same facts about its 
portfolio), a conceptually sound O’Hagan-type argument could still be made. 
 137. As noted earlier, I would balance this with equal attention to the need to winnow out 
meritless lawsuits early on in the litigation. This leads to a more general disclaimer. Demonstrating 
that the market works imperfectly does not by itself justify any given alternative strategy. It is entirely 
possible that the agency costs associated with aggressive litigation are sizable, so that the net benefits 
to investors are minimal. On section 36 specifically, as indicated, I think mechanisms can be crafted 
that achieve a healthy balance. With respect to broader mutual fund reforms, Paul Mahoney and other 
skeptics of regulation may well be right that the better strategy is to try to enhance competition (e.g., 
by allowing different kinds of pricing practices) as opposed to regulating fund activities even more 
heavily. See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 179–80; see also Bogle, supra note 15 (advocating a move 
back toward internal management arrangements). 
 138. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
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Act that offers the rationale.139 It would not be that much of a step to say 
that in light of what we now know about the mutual fund marketplace, 
claims of demand futility ought get more sympathetic treatment as a 
matter of federal policy and that if serious allegations of breach of duty are 
made on behalf of fund shareholders, courts should take a hard look a the 
merits before deferring to the fund’s internal governance processes. 
 139. See supra notes 60–77 and accompanying text. 
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